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ABSTRACT
We present a novel, non-standard recommender system for
large-scale security policy management(SPM). Our system
Helios discovers and recommends unknown and unseen anoma-
lies in large-scale access logs with minimal supervision and
no starting information on users and items. Typical recom-
mender systems assume availability of user- and item-related
information, but such information is not usually available in
access logs. To resolve this problem, we first use discrete cat-
egorical labels to construct categorical combinations from
access logs in a bootstrapping manner. Then, we utilize
rank statistics of entity rank and order categorical combina-
tions for recommendation. From a double-sided cold start,
with minimal supervision, Helios learns to recommend most
salient anomalies at large-scale, and provides visualizations
to security experts to explain rationale behind the recom-
mendations. Our experiments show Helios to be suitable
for large-scale applications: from cold starts, in less than
60 minutes, Helios can analyze roughly 4.6 billion records
in logs of 400GB with about 300 million potential categor-
ical combinations, then generate ranked categorical combi-
nations as recommended discoveries. We also show that,
even with limited computing resources, Helios accelerates
unknown and unseen anomaly discovery process for SPM
by 1 to 3 orders of magnitude, depending on use cases. In
addition, Helios’ design is flexible with metrics and mea-
surement fields used for discoveries and recommendations.
Overall, our system leads to more efficient and customiz-
able SPM processes with faster discoveries of unseen and
unknown anomalies.
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1. INTRODUCTION & MOTIVATION
Large-scale security policy management(SPM) typically
involves human security experts working to refine security
policies, and a major challenge is: unseen potential threats
may have already evaded intrusion detection systems(IDS)
and bypassed web application firewalls(WAF) [1, 2, 3, 31],
and are recorded in web access logs, and such new and un-
known anomalous patterns need to be discovered. How-
ever, without a fast discovery engine, human security ex-
perts are trapped by trying to find needles in ever growing
stacks of web traffic information. The end-to-end time-to-
discover(E2E TTD) is long, the process manual and exhaust-
ing, the information load vast. For example, WAF SPM is
still a largely manual and slow process of analyzing web ac-
cess logs to identify new anomalous patterns to find poten-
tial threats. Further, as web traffic grows, it is more critical
to discover lurking anomalies from heavy loads of logs for
security purposes. Hence, we realize there is a strong need
to discover and prioritize new and previously unseen and
unknown anomalies for security experts[16, 15].
A natural candidate for discovery and prioritization, is
a recommender system. Recommender systems find and
recommend items of interest to users. However, most cur-
rent recommender systems have two major problems. First,
they normally require some combinations of the following
information[23, 9, 14, 25, 29, 24]: (1)User metadata(e.g.
preferred categories of items); (2)Implicit data(e.g. users’
binary responses to items such as “liked” vs. “not liked”
instead of numerical rating scores), and (3)Pre-determined
similarity measurement(e.g. how similar or different two
items are to each other), but none of such information is
available in common web access log formats(Sec.3.1). Sec-
ond, despite the needed information being absent in the data
source, mechanisms of many recommender systems rely on
such information to fulfill the purpose of recommendation
- for example, inferring and recommending items to users,
based on users’ metadata and implicit feedback to similar
items.
However, when discovering new unknown and unseen anoma-
lies, security experts are the users, and more often than not,
they do not possess a prior knowledge of unseen anoma-
lies which are about to be discovered. It is even more un-
likely that security experts could give any feedback on how
much they find certain unseen, unknown, and undiscovered
anomalies suitable for security policy sets. Further, human
experts’ preferences for new anomalies - if any at all - are
not recorded in access log formats, leaving common recom-
mender systems unable to derive preferences and similarity
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Figure 1: Computation Components of Helios.
Sec.2.3, Sec. 3.1-3.5 describe in detail Helios’s holis-
tic system design for SPM. Sec. 4 evaluates perfor-
mance, discovery efficiency, and interpretability.
measurements. When anomalous patterns are discovered
from post-filter access logs, human security experts would
then decided if certain security policies should be amended,
but at the start of the discovery process, they would not
even now what to expect.
With Helios, we present a novel and interpretable recom-
mender system, which achieves the following:
1. It does not assume or rely on the availability of user
metadata, implicit data, and pre-determined similarity
metrics to start the process of recommending items to
human experts. Detailed system design in Sec.3, Fig.1,
and Fig.2.
2. It reduces E2E TTD of unknown anomalies: our ex-
periment consistently shows Helios reduces E2E TTD
by human experts by 1 to 3 orders of magnitude. Ex-
periments in Sec.4.
3. Under minimal supervision(that is, minimal amount of
labeled data), Helios can deal with cold starts, making
it suitable for exploring unknown and unseen anoma-
lies. Details in Sec.3 and 4.
4. Helios is agnostic to data sources, and can be broadly
generalized: users can choose arbitrary categories, dif-
ferent categorical labels, different classes of entities to
be measured and ranked, measurement metrics, and
ranking functions to build customized anomaly discov-
ery process.
As a minimally supervised recommender system for anomaly
discovery and recommendation, Helios has 3 distinct stages
of computation(Fig.1). First, Helios constructs categorical
combinations from discrete categorical labels in access logs,
then use them to compute rank statistics. Second, based
on rank statistics, Helios recommends categorical combina-
tions where highly abnormal patterns occur. Third, Helios
supplies visualizations to human security experts for inter-
preting rationales behind the recommendations. Security
experts can then decided if and which categorical combi-
nations should be incorporated into existing security policy
sets(e.g. access rules configured on WAF). The steps are
elaborated in following sections.
The short E2E TTD makes Helios very suitable for ongo-
ing SPM: Helios can quickly discover new categorical com-
binations which could be potential latent threats, and then
provide interpretable visualizations(sec.4.2) to explain ratio-
nales in discovery process, helping human security experts
make decisions.
Helios’s scalability potential is also suitable for large-scale
SPM. Typically, in a moderately sized enterprise system, be-
tween ≈ 1.5 − 2.6 ∗ 108 entries are recorded in access logs
each hour, and the total number of log entries grows roughly
linearly in time. Moreover, the search space of categorical
Table 1: Cardinalities of Categories
Category Name Cardinality
Country ≥ 200
Browser ≥ 350
Request Type ≥ 50
Customers ≥ 100
Content Type ≥ 100
IP Addresses ≥ 2.5 ∗ 106
combinations is also quite large, while staying roughly con-
stant as the time window widens. For instance, in log of a
typical weekday, with only 6 common categories(Table 1),
there can be roughly 200×350×50×100×100 ≈ 3.5×1010
unique categorical combinations, not counting ≈ 2.5∗106 IP
addresses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
clarifies regularly used terminologies and phrases we use in
the paper, and overviews the background of previous efforts
on building systems to automate certain parts of the SPM
process. Section 3 describes the system design and discovery
process in detail(Fig. 1 shows the design overview); section
4 lays out experiments setups for evaluating Helios and re-
sults, and we conclude that Helios indeed leads to more ef-
ficient SPM anomaly discovery. Section 5 concludes current
work and introduces points of future research interest.
2. OVERVIEW
We clarify terminologies, examine related work, and lay
out challenges we in designing a system for discovering and
recommending unknown anomalies.
2.1 Terminologies
To more clearly deliver our discussions in the following
sections, we now qualitatively define certain terms we use,
especially in the context of SPM and recommender systems.
Def.1 Mean reciprocal rank(MRR): A longstanding met-
ric in evaluating recommender and information retrieval
systems[27] and has several key advantages(Sec.3.2),
MRR is mean value of the reciprocals of an entity’s
rank positions across different rank orderings. MRR
of entity c across n rank orderings is defined as
MRRc ← 1|n|
∑|n|
j=1 RR(c,j)
where RR(c,j) is the reciprocal of c’s rank position in
a rank ordering j , where all existing entities in j are
sorted by a ranking function F based on measurement
metric M . In our experiments, we sort all rank order-
ings by decreasing order based on counts of access log
entries. Fig.3 below shows steps to compute MRR
Rank positions
Reciprocal ranks
(RR) MRR
Figure 3: Compute MRR from a rank ordering
An example of the computation process is as follows:
in 5 different rank orderings, item c has rank positions:
(2, 2, 10, None, 5). Then, RR for c in these orderings
are: ( 1
2
, 1
2
, 1
10
, None, 1
5
). Finally, MRRc ← 1|5−1| ( 12 +
1
2
+ 1
10
+ 1
5
) = 0.325. So in other words, MRR is the
Figure 2: SPM with Helios: Discover, rank, recommend anomalies with human feedback to security policies
harmonic mean of rank positions.
Def.2 Cold start : When the discovery process starts, no
a priori information is given or inference can be con-
cluded about users or items. The cold start problems
we have seen in recommender systems research, are
primarily starting without user information. []
Def.3 Categorical combination : A length n categorical
combination of categorical labels, is an ordered tuple
of length n, where each value in the tuple is a categori-
cal value. Multiple access entries may map to identical
categorical combinations.
For example, (Firefox, United States, text/html) is a
length 3 categorical combination with ordered categor-
ical labels from 3 categories in an access log: “Browser”,
“Country”, and“Content Type”, and many entries share
this combination of browser, country, and content type
in the access logs.
Def.4 Security policy management(SPM): Ongoing con-
figurations of rules and policies for access and traffic
control for servers, clients, services, and/or applica-
tions. A human security expert is involved to adjust
and refine the configurations. Security services with
SPM are known as “managed security services”, e.g.
managed WAF is a WAF with SPM.
Def.5 End-to-end time-to-discovery(E2E TTD): A straight-
forward metric to measure efficiency of unknown anomaly
discovery. The starting “end” is web access logs that
record any traffic not blocked by WAF, the finishing
“end” is the discovered anomalies. The time between
starting to process web access logs and finishing search-
ing for anomalies is the TTD. The shorter TTD is, the
more efficient a system is in discovery new anomalies.
Def.6 Supervision : In machine learning(ML) contexts, “su-
pervision” qualitatively describes the amount of la-
beled data needed for training ML system. Needing
only minimal amount of labeled data(Sec.3) to start
the discovery process, Helios is a minimally supervised
system.
2.2 Related Work
In recent years, there have been considerable efforts in
high-profile security conferences on building systems to au-
tomate parts of the SPM process. Several notable works
focus on Android SPM from different angles, and have built
different systems with ML - especially natural language pro-
cessing(NLP) - techniques in an effort to automate the SPM
process. For example, [22] ranks risks of Android apps by
na¨ıve Bayes and a hierarchical Bayesian model, [21]identi-
fies app permissions with a set of NLP techniques, [18] pre-
dicts network log data leak instances by a random forest,
and [28] constructed a ML system with a feedback loop for
Android SPM based on a K-nearest neighbor process. Out-
side of the Android SPM sphere, [19] mined clusters out of
event logs for system fault management purposes. On the
other hand, recommender systems have succeeded in large-
scale consumer-facing applications [12, 17, 8], specializing
in predicting and recommending items to users’ preferences.
Despite such success of recommender systems and a con-
spicuous call to build more efficient and automated SPM
processes[15], using recommender systems for discoveries in
efficient SPM has not been explored in publications. The
venues we have searched range from dedicated one such as
RecSys[35](for recommender systems) and top four security
conferences[36, 34, 13], and next to none was done to use rec-
ommender system for building more efficient, interpretable,
hence more usable SPM system at large-scale.
2.3 Challenges
Discovering previously unseen, therefore unknown anoma-
lies for SPM is more challenging than classic anomaly detec-
tion and IDS designs. Classic anomaly detectors, WAF, and
IDS raise alerts when certain pre-defined rules or certain pri-
ors are violated[26, 5, 11, 30, 10]. However, such “define and
classify” design is limited in capability to discover unknown
anomalies, because they face four major challenges:
Ch.1:Real-world logs after WAF and IDS filtering also con-
tain latent potential threats. Certain web access events can
more easily evade detections than others do[1, 2, 3, 31], and
it is often challenging trying to discover those potentially
malicious access events from the wider context of presumed
“benign” events in the WAF-filtered logs. Our purpose of
building Helios is precisely to address this “finding the un-
known unknowns” problem in SPM.
Ch.2:Large-scale networks produce large number of access
log events, and the logs after filtering are still voluminous.
Manual analyses of the access logs by human security ex-
perts to find new latent threats is time-consuming and im-
practical. Hence, an automated or semi-automated system
is needed for post-filter logs. In Fig. 1, we illustrate compu-
tational components and non-computational system designs
for a semi-automated human-in-the-loop SPM process with
Helios handling the large scale. Experiments in Sec.4 fur-
ther shows scalability performance and discovery efficiency.
Ch.3:Scarce knowledge of rules and priors beforehand for
latent potential threats. Unlike anomaly detectors, WAF,
and IDS with pre-defined normality, rules, and/or priors, it
is difficult to extract information or infer knowledge about
what the latent threats could be. In fact, even security ex-
perts often do not know what could potentially be found in
access logs. In Sec. 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, we go through details of
discovering and recommending anomalies in a double-sided
cold-start scenario, where neither user- nor item-related in-
formation is supplied in access log.
Ch.4:Assumption of stationarity : SPM is an ongoing pro-
cess because both benign behaviors and latent threats keep
evolving with new software, applications, services, and vul-
nerabilities. Pre-defined rules and priors are likely lagging
behind the evolution process[4]. In Sec. 3.1, we describe a
method of discovering baselines from current access logs in
a bootstrapping manner.
Meanwhile, despite successful large-scale applications [17,
12], two major approaches to recommender systems - col-
laborative filtering [23, 9] and content-based[20, 6] systems
- both normally assume availability of implicit data, user
metadata, and similarity measurement in the input [23, 25,
29, 14, 7, 6], which web access logs do not have(cf. Sec.1).
For example, widely-used common log formats specified by
Apache and W3C[33, 32] only include fields such as client
user agent or browser, IP address, request, and request sta-
tus, and even for sophisticated log formats, information needed
by traditional recommender systems is still not available.
For example, in a moderately sized enterprise network we
work with, its customized and fairly sophisticated log for-
mat has these categories:
Unique ID, Source Entity, HTTP/HTTPS, Device, De-
vice Operating System, Content Type, User Agent, Country,
Request Status, Client IP, Content Length, Request URL,
Request Type, Host, Proxy, Date, Hour, UNIX Epoch
Figure 4: Discover: Generate Baseline - Details
Clearly, none of the categories in the log indicates human
experts’ preferences and prior knowledge, nor metadata and
meaningful numerical variables for common recommender
systems to construct ground truths, before even starting the
recommendation process.
In addition to the lack of user metadata and general prior
knowledge, because new anomalous patterns are unknown
and unseen, human security experts often do not even know
what new unknown abnormalities to look for. This poses a
double-sided cold start problem for recommender systems:
there is no information about “users”(security experts), and
there is little information about the “items”(abnormalities
in access logs), either. Needing more information than what
is available in access logs and from security experts, com-
mon recommender systems’ approaches do not address the
problem of unknown anomaly discovery.
Helios fills this gap, by efficiently discovering and recom-
mending unknown anomalies. Without the usual informa-
tion available on users or items, Helios bootstraps to dis-
cover, rank, recommend, and visualize salient anomalies for
security experts. It also handles the heavy traffic load and
number of categorical combinations to search through for
discovery and ranking, which addresses a key pain point in
today’s SPM process(Sec.1).
3. RECOMMENDER SYSTEM FOR DISCOV-
ERING & RANKING ANOMALIES
3.1 Discover: Generate Baseline
The double-sided cold start problem(Sec.2.3) is obvious in
access log L: users do not have knowledge about unknown
anomalies, and entries in L gives no information about un-
known anomalies either. Between the two difficult scenarios,
extracting user-related knowledge is much less meaningful
and practical: after all, an anomaly discovery and recom-
mender system should find unknown anomalies for security
expert users, not waiting for users to tell it what to look for.
Hence, the only practical way to alleviate the double-sided
cold start, is finding a way to extract item-related informa-
tion from L. Given the vast number of entries in L(Sec.
1), and the formats of L heavily use categorical values(Sec.
2.3), we propose a method to bootstrap baseline categorical
combinations from L. After an example(cf. Fig.4), we will
give a more formal representation.
Suppose there are m distinct categories A1, A2, . . . , Am in
L. Let m = 3, where A1 = “Browser”, A2 = “Country”, and
A3 = “Content Type”. M is the number of entries logged in
L, F is sorting numerical values in descending order, and we
take the top 2 values in each category. Therefore, r1 is the
rank ordering of all browsers descendingly by each browser’s
number of entries in L, and A1,(3) ← r1[: 2] is the set of the
2 browsers with the largest numbers of entries logged in L.
To find the top 2 values in each category, there are 3
steps(Fig.4). First, for each of the 2 categories, we aggre-
gated all entries in the log to count the number of entries
with every value within each category. Second, we sorted
and ranked each category in descending order according to
count of entries, hence we now have 3 rank orderings: r1, r2,
and r3, then we take 2 highest ranked values in each. For
example, the values can be: Firefox, Safari(Browser); US,
UK (Country); text/html, image/jpeg(Content type). Fi-
nally, without loss of generality, suppose the length 3 cat-
egorical combinations will be in the form of ordered tuple
(Browser, Country, Content Type). With 2 values for per-
mutation in 3 categories, there can be 23 = 8 categorical
combinations: (Firefox, US, text/html), (Firefox,US,image/jpeg),
(Firefox, UK, text/html), (Firefox,UK, image/jpeg),(Safari,US,
text/html), (Safari,US,image/jpeg), (Safari,UK,text/html),
(Safari,UK,image/jpeg). These 8 tuples form SB , baseline
categorical combinations discovered from L.
For a more formal representation, we let nj = card(Aj), ∀1 ≤
j ≤ m indicate cardinality of Aj , which is simply the num-
ber of distinct categorical values1 within the category Aj .
As we already saw in example(Table 1, Sec.2.1), there could
be
m∏
j=1
nj unique categorical combinations, because of per-
mutation Sall = {A1 ×A2 . . .×Am } that generates all cat-
egorical combinations, is Cartesian product of all Aj . Let
1We use card to indicate cardinality of a set
M be the measurement metric(s), F be the ranking func-
tion, p the number of values to take from each category2, a
more formal representation of our method to discover base-
line categorical combinations is:
This process of discovering baseline categorical combi-
nations address two challenges in Sec. 2.3. Ch.3(“cold
start”) is a major challenge for recommender systems, and
Ch.4(“assumption of stationarity”) is a well-known concern
for ML-based security applications[4]. Without user- nor
item-related information(e.g. preference, feedback or simi-
larity), and without labeled data as input to train, Helios
discovers baselines from access log in a bootstrapping man-
ner. Further, the baseline is drawn from current access log,
as opposed to using information from previous access logs,
therefore this baseline can be considered near real-time, and
will changes as access log changes.
3.2 Discover: Generate Non-baseline
If a categorical combination does not belong to SB - the
returned result from Sec.3.1 - it is a non-baseline categorical
combination. Continuing the example in Sec.3.1, any cate-
gorical combination that is not one of the 8 tuples specified
in the example, is considered non-baseline: If an ordered
tuple of length 3 has the form (Browser, Country, Content
Type), and the browser is not Firefox or Safari, or the coun-
try is not US or UK, or any content type tis not image/jpeg
or text/html, the tuple is one of non-baseline categorical com-
binations. (Firefox, UK, text/plain) is a non-baseline cat-
egorical combination, for instance. The 3 categories in L
could generate ≈ 350× 200× 100 ≈ 7× 106 unique categor-
ical combinations, and other than the 8 tuples specified, all
of the 7× 106 categorical combinations are non-baseline.
More formally, SB is the set of baseline categorical combi-
nations discovered from log L, and Sall = {A1×A2 . . .×Am }
is all unique categorical combinations in the form of length
m ordered tuples. Snb, the set of non-baseline categorical
combinations, is SNB ← {A1 ×A2 . . .×Am} \ SB , which is
any categorical combination that is not in SB .
3.3 Rank: Compute Rank Statistics
With baseline and non-baseline categorical combinations
already discovered from L, we show in Fig.5 the next stages
of ranking and recommending top K most abnormal cate-
gorical combinations. We first compute MRR from baseline
categorical combinations, and RR from non-baseline ones.
Then we apply a distance function to measure the distances
between MRRs and RRs for different categorical combina-
tions, and rank such distances in descending order. Finally,
those K categorical combinations that come on top of the
rank ordering are recommended as most abnormal categor-
ical combinations to human experts for SPM.
2Here we set pi = pj , ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ m and i 6= j, but there is
absolutely no such restriction while generating baseline cate-
gorical combinations. To generalize, there are
m∏
j=1
pj baseline
categorical combinations.
Figure 5: Rank & Recommend - Details
As a discovery and recommender system, Helios customizes
its recommendations at the entity level. A typical example
of “entities”, is the group of end customers of network-based
service providers such as content delivery networks and fi-
nancial transaction processing gateways, which serve multi-
ple customers’ websites. As seen in Fig.2, access requests
to customers’ websites are filtered by security policies, and
then recorded in access logs - where customers’ websites are
often identified as “source entity” in log formats. In the rank
and recommendation stage, Helios identifies different sets of
most abnormal categorical combinations for different enti-
ties, and we will continue to describe the process with the
same example setting in Sec.3.1-3.2.
Take two customers codenamed “SK” and “WN” from 200
customers in L as examples, and based on the same M(number
of entries logged in L), F (sorting in descending order), we
find that in each of L’s subsets which satisfies a baseline
categorical combinations(e.g. all (browser, country, content
type) are set to (Firefox, UK, text/html)), their rank posi-
tions among all customers, are RSK,baseline = (38, 22, 45, None,
None,None, 37, 26), and RWN,baseline = (2, 1, 1, 3, 17, None,
None,None), respectively. By Def.1, SK’s and WN’s MRRs
calculated from the baseline categorical combinations, are
listed in Table 2. By interpretation of MRR(Def. 1), SK’s
expected mean rank is ≈ 31, and WN’s ≈ 2. Now consider
two non-baseline categorical combinations, snb,1 and snb,2,
from which SK’s and WN’s ranks and RRs are recorded in
Table 2. Finally, let the distance function D be L-1 distance,
so we compute absolute values of differences between SK’s
MRR and RRs of SK’s rank positions in all non-baseline
categorical combinations. Results are shown in the last 2
rows of Table 2. Computing rank statistics continues on to
all customers, thier MRRs, and their L-1 distances between
MRRs and all non-baseline categorical combinations where
these entities have rank position, and final results of L-1 dis-
tances are stored in a data structure indexed by entity and
non-categorical combinations to prepare for the recommen-
dation stage(Sec.3.4).
Table 2: Rank: Compute Rank Statistics Examples
Name SK WN
MRR∗ 0.032 0.578
Expected rank 1/0.032≈31 1/0.578≈2
R(∗,nb,1) 4 10
RR(∗,nb,1) 1/4 = 0.25 1/10 = 0.1
R(∗,nb,2) 25 50
RR(∗,nb,2) 1/25 = 0.04 1/50 = 0.02
d(∗,nb,1) |0.032 - 0.25|=0.218 |0.578 - 0.1|=0.478
d(∗,nb,2) |0.032 - 0.04|=0.008 |0.578 - 0.02|=0.576
There are 3 advantages of using RR and MRR ci instead
of simple ranks or normalized ranks(cf. Sec.2.1).
Adv.1 Both RR and MRR are bounded: RR, MRR ∈ (0, 1] .
Same range for all entities being ranked, easy to mea-
sure and compare across rank orderings.
Adv.2 MRR, as mean of multiple RRs, measures the mag-
nitude of difference between one group of ranks and
another group of ranks for the same entity.
Adv.3 By comparing one entity’s MRR computed from the
group of baseline ranks, and the same entity’s RR
in individual non-baseline ranks, we can measure how
far each rank in an individual rank ordering(measured
by RR) is from the expected mean rank(measured by
MRR). Because each rank ordering is indexed by a
categorical combination, the magnitude of differences
is measurement for how far individual categorical com-
binations are from baseline ones
Input: Access log L, baseline categorical combinations
SB , non-baseline categorical combinations SNB
1 initialize D, an empty indexable and sortable data
structure
// for example, a Python list
2 forall cj ∈ C do
// Compute baseline MRR for entity cj
3 MRRj ← 1card(SB)
∑card(SB)
q=1 RR(q,j)
// RR(q) is indexed by sq
4 forall snb ∈ SNB do
// append D with the L-1 distance between
RR(nb) and MRRj
5 D ← D _ (d1(RR(nb) −MRRj))
6 return D
Algorithm 1: Rank: Compute Rank Statistics
Algorithm 2 shows a more generalized formal representa-
tion: ∃ C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}, a class of entities in L, and for
some of L’s subsets L(i) = {L | (A1, A2, . . . , Am) = si} 6= ∅,
where si is a length m categorical combination and si ∈ Sall,
and C(i), a subset of C, is in L(s,i) . By measurement
metric M and ranking function F , within L(i), C(i) can
form a rank order of its members: R(i) ← F (Ci, by =
M). Hence, it follows that RR of all C(i)’s members is
RR(i) ← 1/R(i), where cj ’s RR is RR(i,j). It then follows
that if si ∈ SB , for any cj ∈ C, the MRR of cj is simply
MRRj ← 1card(SB)
∑card(SB)
q=1 RR(q,j).
3.4 Recommend: Find Most Abnormal Cate-
gorical Combinations
When recommending most abnormal K categorical com-
binations for each entity in C, we only make two simple
assumptions:
Asp.1 For arbitrary ci, MRR computed from baseline cate-
gorical combinations SB are considered normal for ci,
and MRRi would be largely preserved across categor-
ical combinations considered normal for ci.
Asp.2 For non-baseline categorical combinations snb,j , snb,q ∈
SNB , snb,j 6= snb,q, an entity ci, if L-1 distances:
d1(RRi,snb,j −MRRi) > d1(RRi,snb,q −MRRi),
then for ci, categorical combination snb,j is more ab-
normal than categorical combination snb,q.
Similarly, if for another snb,t ∈ SNB , if L-1 distances:
d1(RRi,snb,t −RRi,snb,j ) < d1(RRi,snb,t −RRi,snb,q ),
then for ci, categorical combination snb,t is more sim-
ilar to categorical combination snb,j .
By Adv.3 in Sec. 3.3 and the two assumptions, the rec-
ommender system regards that for an entity ci, those non-
baseline categorical combinations producing the largest L-1
distances between baseline categorical combinations, are re-
garded as most highly abnormal categorical combinations.
For example, in Table 2, according to the last two rows
recording L-1 distances between SK’s and WN’s MRRs to
their RRs in two non-baseline categorical combinations, s(nb,1)
is more abnormal for customer entity SK than s(nb,2), while
s(nb,2) is more abnormal for customer entity WN than s(nb,1).
Suppose that a data structure DSK which stores and in-
dexes SK’s L-1 distances by categorical combinations, the
following process finds top K most abnormal non-baseline
categorical combinations for SK. First: sort DSK values in
descending order. Then, extract top K non-baseline cate-
gorical combinations associated with top K L-1 distances.
This system workflow is described in Algorithm 3.
Input: Integer K, data structure D from Algorithm 2
with all L-1 distances indexed by entity ci and
non-baseline categorical combinations snb
1 Initialize DS, an indexable data structure to store
results
// For example, a Python dictionary or array
2 forall ci ∈ C do
3 Dci ← sort(Dci , order = descending)
// Find top K categorical combinations with
largest L-1 distances to MRRi
4 s(nb,i) ← Dci [: K]
// Append DS with top K categorical
combinations, indexed by entity ci
5 DS ← DS _ s(nb,i)
6 return DS
Algorithm 2: Rank & Recommend Categorical Combina-
tions
3.5 Visualize & Interpret
A natural follow-up from human security experts, after
seeing the K most abnormal categorical combinations, would
be asking “why” Helios finding these particular categori-
cal combinations most abnormal. Indeed, recommendations
without interpretable rationales as support evidence, are not
very helpful in SPM: security experts need to understand,
explain, and justify reasons, before making decisions on ad-
justing existing security policies. To address this need, He-
lios provides visualizations based on RR, MRR, and rank
orderings to help security experts understand why Helios
made such decisions. We give an example in Sec.4.3.
4. EVALUATIONS
The challenges we address with Helios for SPM, are 1)to
improve performance at large-scale applications, and 2)to
boost discovery efficiency for unknown abnormal patterns
in access logs(Sec. 2.3). To test Helios’s performance and
efficiency baseline, we ask the following research questions:
RQ1 Does Helios maintain reasonable E2E TTDs at differ-
ent scales?
RQ2 Does Helios improve efficiency for discovering abnor-
mal categorical combinations in access logs, comparing
Figure 6: ln(E2E TTD) for human and Helios, as
number of customers grows
to the largely manual process that many human secu-
rity experts go through regularly? In other words, does
Helios shorten E2E TTDs for human experts? If so,
by how much?
In following evaluation experiments, we use large-scale real-
world access logs with limited computing resources, to test
for performance, potential for large-scale applications, and
discovery efficiency. We chose “customers” to be the class
of entities C, and 4 categories to generate categorical com-
binations: Category A1 as “Browser”, A2 “Country”, A3
“Content Type”, A4 “Request Type”. Hence, the categor-
ical combination would be the length 4 ordered tuple of the
form (Browser, Country, Content Type, Request Type). We
also set measurement metric M as number of log entries,
ranking function F as unweighed M sorted in descending
order, number of categorical values to take while discover
baseline(Sec.3.1) as p = 2, and top K=5 most abnormal
categorical combinations for each entity.
4.1 One: Performance Experiment
We used a 45 GB 3-hour access log Lh1 of 6.5 ∗ 108 en-
tries(retrieved without the “hours” mark), a 15 GB 1-hour
log Lh2 of 1.01 ∗ 108 entries, and a 6 GB 1-hour log Lh3 of
8.3 ∗ 107 entries for testing performance benchmark. Any
tools or platforms with reasonable distributed computing,
storage, and support for indexable and sortable data struc-
tures are sufficient, and in the examples, we used Apache
Spark on a local standalone cluster(a laptop with 4 GB work-
ing RAM and 4 2.30GHz processors). There are card(C)
> 120 customers to be ranked in each log, and at least
≈ 200 × 350 × 50 × 100 ≈ 3.5 × 108 of categorical com-
binations to search through, as generated by the Cartesian
product of {A1, A2, A3, A4}. We observed that, the cardinal-
ity of each category does not change dramatically according
to the length of time window. This means that computing
performance of Helios is not heavily impacted by bigger data
volume from larger time windows. Specifics of the 3 sets are
listed in Table 3. Note that although cardinality of log en-
tries increases roughly linearly, the cardinalities of categories
- especially A1, A2, A3 - do not explode nearly as rapidly.
We processed Lh1, Lh2, Lh3 each 3 times, and recorded E2E
TTDs in Table 3. We checked for all categories’ cardinali-
Table 3: Experiment Specifications
Category Lh1 Lh2 Lh3
card(entries) 6.5 ∗ 108 1.01 ∗ 108 8.3 ∗ 107
card(A1) 400+ 350+ 350+
card(A2) 200+ 200+ 200+
card(A3) 160+ 150+ 120+
card(A4) 200+ 50+ ≈ 50
E2E TTD ≤ 60mins ≤ 55mins ≤ 50mins
ties for a typical 24-hour-window of estimated ≈400GB ac-
cess log with 4.6 billion entries. The cardinalities are very
similar to those of Lh1, meaning that likely, it can be pro-
cessed within 60 minutes to produce top K most abnormal
categorical combinations to each entity. This means that
prioritized recommendations can be generated for a week’s
worth of logs in less than an hour on a 4-processor laptop.
4.2 Two: Discovery Efficiency Experiment
For this experiment, we used another one-hour access log
of 13.2GB and 2 ∗ 108 entries in a cold start environment.
To evaluate the discovery efficiency, we ran the experiment
on a standalone Apache Spark cluster: a desktop with 16
GB working RAM and 8 3.40GHz processors. We set the
default parallelism to 4 and the number of executor to 1,
and only change the number of executor cores as 1, 2, and
4. Under each core number, 3 experiments were run, and
the E2E TTD are recorded in the table below. The TTDs
are rounded up or down to the nearest minute, and we have
found that given the same number of cores, the performance
is remarkably consistent. We also asked a human expert -
with assistance of his own tools - to start from the same
dataset, and recorded the discovery time for comparison.
Using his own tools and methods, our human expert started
from the same access log as Helios did, and attempted to
find highly abnormal patterns.
Table 4: Experiment: Discovery Efficiency
1 core 2 cores 4 cores
Helios 45min 23min 13min
Human Expert ≈ 110min(one entity)
Our security expert spent ≈56 minutes processing access
log data, and≈54 minutes searching for potential abnormali-
ties for one specific customer. The projection is that for each
customer who demands SPM, he would spend ≈5 to 50 min-
utes to search for potential abnormalities. For Helios, when
the 3 computation components(Fig.1) are finished, each cus-
tomer’s top K most abnormal categorical combinations are
already stored in a data structure. Hence, more generally,
as number of entities increase, E2E TTD for human experts
to execute discovery and recommendation process for SPM
scales roughly linearly. Meanwhile, Helios’s E2E TTD re-
mains largely constant. Fig.6 compares E2E TTD between
human experts and Helios as number of customer who needs
SPM grows.
4.3 Three: Interpretability
Suppose that one of the most abnormal categorical com-
binations for the customer SK is (Mobile Safari,Singapore,
text/plain,POST)(Fig.8), and one of the baseline categorical
Figure 7: SK’s rank in one baseline categorical com-
bination (Chrome,United States,image/jpeg,GET)
Figure 8: SK’s rank in one of the most
abnormal categorical combination (Mobile Sa-
fari,Singapore,text/plain,POST)
combinations is (Chrome,United States,image/jpeg,GET)(Fig.7).
How does Helios decide that the condition in Fig.8 warrants
additional human expert attention? With 2 typical figures,
we describe how Helios provides relevant visualizations to
give straightforward interpretations to security experts on
decision rationales(Sec.3.5). The thin vertical lines in
Fig.7(on far left close to y-axis) and Fig.8 indicate customer
SK’s rank position among all other customers with access
log events under each categorical combination. In Fig.7, the
vertical line is close to the y-axis, indicating that under the
specific baseline categorical combination, and based on the
measurement metric M(count of log entries) and ranking
function F (unweighed M sorted in descending order), SK’s
rank is 1. In Fig.8, the vertical line is drastically shifted to
the right, directly showing the visual difference that based
on the same M and F but under different categorical com-
binations, SK’s ranks drop dramatically and almost fall to
the bottom of all customers.
Fig.7 represents one of the baseline categorical combina-
tions(We provide only one such baseline graph for illustra-
tion purpose. In practice, because there are multiple base-
line categorical combinations, Helios provides as many base-
line graphs as the number of baseline categorical combina-
tions. The only exception is that if under a certain combina-
tion, an entity has no events in the filtered access log, then
the baseline graph is not provided.), while Fig.8 represents
one of the most abnormal categorical combinations.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented Helios, a novel, non-standard recommender
system for large-scale SPM: it efficiently discovers unseen
hence unknown abnormal patterns from web access logs.
Based on a generic minimally supervised method, Helios
does not rely on having user or item data beforehand that are
commonly available to recommender systems. Using discrete
categorical labels from access logs to build categorical com-
binations, Helios offers a flexible and interpretable discovery
engine for abnormal categorical combinations in access logs.
Experiments showed that Helios largely augments security
experts’ capabilities to discover unknown new latent threats
at large scale, and our approach has four advantages:
1. Helios’ discovery and recommendation mechanism is
intuitive and interpretable: constructing baseline cat-
egorical combinations is similar to building queries in
a SQL-like grammar, and discrete categorical values
are treated as content features.
2. Helios is flexible: Users can customize baseline cate-
gorical combinations SB , class of entities C, measure-
ment metrics M , and ranking function F based on
availability of priors, and then use Helios to discover
and prioritize unknown and unseen abnormalities.
3. Minimally-supervised, Helios learns to recommend anoma-
lies from double-sided cold starts, where no informa-
tion from users or items are available. Helios’ visual-
izations provide reasons of recommending certain cat-
egorical combinations as most anomalous.
4. Helios scales well even with limited computing resources
(Sec.4.1-4.2), and this makes it suitable for large-scale
customized SPM applications.
We plan to incorporate relevance feedback from the users
to provide even more targeted results, as feedback can be
treated as “implicit feedback” from the point of view of a
content-based recommender system. Currently, our system
deals with log data from specific lengths of time windows
such as 1 hour or 1 week, and we plan to build a generative
model for temporal pattern analysis, based on our efficient
model as shown in Sec.4.2. Our further plan also includes
metric learning, imputations of missing ranks, and grammar
induction for semantic recommendations.
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